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“A Great and Noble Scheme”:
Thoughts on the Expulsion of the Acadians
IN THE AUTUMN OF 1755 OFFICERS AND TROOPS from New England, acting
under the authority of the colonial governors of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts,
systematically rounded up more than 7,000 Acadians who lived in communities along
the shores of the Bay of Fundy. Men, women, and children alike were crowded into
transport vessels and deported in small groups to the other British colonies. Many
families were separated, some never to meet again. The remaining 10,000 to 12,000
Acadians managed to escape and spent years as refugees. Many took up arms in
resistance. The campaign of removal continued for eight years, by which time a total
of more than 10,000 Acadians had been forced from their homes and dispersed widely
across the Atlantic world. Meanwhile, their property was plundered, their
communities were torched and their lands were seized.
Some of the most appalling violence occurred at the site of present-day
Fredericton, New Brunswick, in a village called Sainte-Anne along both sides of the
St. John River, which was home to approximately 1,000 Acadians. In November
1758, Colonel Robert Monckton, in command of 2,000 troops, ascended the river as
far as present-day Gagetown, leaving a swath of destruction on both banks; he
succeeded in capturing few of the Acadians living there, though, as most of them had
fled upriver to Sainte-Anne. To remedy this, two months later in February 1759
Monckton sent a company of 15 New England rangers, under the command of
Lieutenant Moses Hazen of Massachusetts, to strike that community. Hazen was
ordered to “kill them all and give no quarter”.1 He succeeded in bringing back 23
prisoners and 6 scalps. Joseph Godin-Bellefontaine, several years a resident of Sainte-
Anne at the time, provided a rare first-hand Acadian account of the attack. The rangers
captured his entire family, Godin-Bellefontaine declared in a deposition taken by
French authorities. He and his grown son Michel were bound hand and foot and
forced to watch as the Yankees abused their wives and daughters. “They took their
rage to the point of massacring his daughter Nastazie, wife of Eustache Paré”, reads
the deposition, “crushing her head with a blow of the butt of a gun, his two children
and a son of Michel, and splitting the head of the wife of the latter with a blow of a
hatchet”.2 The surviving members of the Godin-Bellefontaine family were sent to
Halifax and eventually transported to France.
The Acadians had a term for this violent turn in their history: le grand dérangement
or the great upheaval. It continued from 1755 until the end of the Seven Years War
between Great Britain and France in 1763. It claimed thousands of lives and laid
waste one of the oldest colonial homelands in North America. After the war hundreds
1 John Mack Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French
Acadians from their American Homeland (New York, 2005), p. 405. Aside from material from other
sources (noted in footnotes), the information cited in Faragher’s talk was taken from this book and are
referenced in the text by the page numbers within brackets.
2 Quoted in Richard J. Bergeron, “Three Acadian Generations: The First Bergeron d’Amboises in The
Americas”, http://www.acadian.org/bergeron.html (accessed 4 December 2005).
John Mack Faragher, “‘A Great and Noble Scheme’: Thoughts on the Expulsion of the
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of surviving Acadians settled again in the region, but not on their former farms for
those had been turned over to Yankee settlers from New England. Other Acadians
sought refuge in the French colony of Louisiana, where they became the ancestors of
today’s Cajuns.
My idea for a book focusing on this horrible episode began to take shape during a
visit my wife and I paid to our daughter, who was attending graduate school at the
University of Louisiana in the city of Lafayette, which is sometimes referred to as the
capital of Cajun Country. On a memorable Sunday afternoon in November 1995 the
three of us drove down Bayou Teche to Longfellow-Evangeline State Historic Site
and there, in the reconstructed cabin of an Acadian exile, I first saw the poster
“Acadian Odyssey”, produced by Parks Canada, which maps the Expulsion of the
Acadians.
Aside from short discussions in histories of the French and Indian War, boyhood
memories of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s “Evangeline”, and the plaintive chorus
of The Band’s “Acadian Driftwood”, it was something I knew very little about. But it
was something that seemed familiar. At that time the world was just learning of the
fearful episodes of ethnic cleansing taking place in the former Yugoslavia and the
central African state of Rwanda. In the gift shop at the site I bought Carl Brasseaux’s
little book on the Deportation, Scattered to the Wind, and before bed that night I had
learned enough to know that the Expulsion of the Acadians, so strikingly similar to
contemporary events of ethnic cleansing, was something about which I needed to
know much more.
Quite early in my research I discovered a startling piece of evidence from which I
drew the title of my book: a dispatch written by an anonymous correspondent,
datelined Halifax, 9 August 1755, and published several weeks later in the colonial
press of New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland: “We are now upon a great and noble
Scheme of sending the neutral French out of this Province, who have always been
secret Enemies, and have encouraged our Savages to cut our Throats. If we effect their
Expulsion, it will be one of the greatest Things that ever the English did in America;
for by all the Accounts, that Part of the Country they possess, is as good Land as any
in the World: In case therefore we could get some good English Farmers in their
Room, this Province would abound with all Kinds of Provisions” (p. 333). This
statement amounts to as frank an acknowledgement as one might fear to find that le
grand dérangement was a classic episode of ethnic cleansing.
Compare it with the statement issued by the United Nations Commission of
Experts, convened by the Secretary General in 1992 to investigate the violent conflict
in the Balkans. “Ethnic cleansing”, the commissioners concluded, “is a purposeful
policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-
inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from
certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out in the name of misguided
nationalism, historic grievances, and a powerful driving sense of revenge. This
purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group
or groups” (p. 469). Note how this definition amplifies the meaning of the August
1755 dispatch: the ethnic contrast drawn between “the neutral French” and “good
English farmers”. There is also an appeal to historic grievances and the desire for
revenge: “the neutral French, who have always been secret Enemies, and have
encouraged our Savages to cut our Throats”. And there is a connection made between
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dispossession and repossession: “If we effect their Expulsion, it will be one of the
greatest Things that ever the English did in America; for by all the Accounts, that Part
of the Country they possess, is as good Land as any in the World: In case therefore
we could get some good English Farmers in their Room, this Province would abound
with all Kinds of Provisions”. Ethnic cleansing always has this dimension – one ethnic
or religious group clearing away another by violent and terror-inspiring means and an
eagerness to seize their lands and possessions. Ethnic cleansing is nearly always a
process of dispossession followed by repossession.
Most Americans in the United States are unfamiliar with the story of le grand
dérangement, just as they are unacquainted with the Acadians. If Acadians are known
to us at all, it is as the unfortunate people of Longfellow’s epic poem. For Americans
of a certain age, myself included, “Evangeline” was required reading in public school.
Yet Longfellow’s Acadians were a literary creation, little more than victims who
endured other men’s prejudice, hatred and greed. For me, one of the most valuable
lessons of this project was discovering the Acadians of history rather than legend.
Although they were largely illiterate, their voices may be excavated from the colonial
records of France and Great Britain. The Acadians turn out to be fascinating and
important subjects in their own right.
Today Acadian descendants number several hundred thousand persons in eastern
Canada and southwestern Louisiana in addition to tens of thousands more spread
across the map of North America. 2005 marked the 250th anniversary of le grand
dérangement and, over the course of those centuries, Acadian and Cajun society
survived and more recently has thrived. That it has done so is, in important ways, the
result of the strong sense of identity Acadians had developed before 1755.
Acadian history begins with the French colonists of the early-17th century who
settled on the shores of Baie Française (known today as the Bay of Fundy) at roughly
the same time English colonists were settling the colonies of Plymouth and
Massachusetts Bay. French authorities hoped to transplant to the New World a
hierarchical society of lords and peasants. But the Old World was a long way off, the
social and religious institutions of the ancien regime were stunted in transplantation,
and what developed instead was a clannish frontier society of farmers and fishermen
who enjoyed rough equality and suffered few distinctions of rank.
The French may have been unsuccessful in transplanting feudal institutions, but
they were quite successful in their missionary efforts among the Mi’kmaq, the most
numerous of the Native peoples of the region, as Catholicism proved a powerful bond
between colonist and Native. One missionary provided a description that is suggestive
of the way a common faith encouraged cultural mixing. A contingent of colonists on
a trading mission along the Fundy coast was invited to attend a Native celebration.
“All night”, the missionary wrote, “there was continual haranging, singing, and
dancing”. Horrified at the thought that “probably their songs and dances were
invocations to the devil”, he asked the colonists to perform some of their sacred songs
– to purify the air, so to speak. The men offered up hymns to the blessed virgin. Soon
the Natives joined in with chants of their own, and before long both colonists and
Natives were dancing and singing together. Even this relatively humorless missionary
was delighted. “It was really very comical”, he wrote, “for you would have said that
they were two choirs which had a thorough understanding of each other” (p. 27). The
Catholic missionary effort created a bond of sympathy between Natives and colonists
Acadiensis84
18024-05 Faragher Forum  2/23/07  5:32 PM  Page 84
in l’Acadie that made possible genuinely intimate personal relations.
Because many colonists of the first generation came to l’Acadie as single men,
there was also a considerable amount of intermarriage with Mi’kmaq women.
Eventually the two peoples came to think of themselves as kindred. Living in
ethnically mixed communities, colonists readily adopted indigenous ways. From the
Mi’kmaq they learned the arts of fishing and hunting, methods of making clothing and
moccasins from skins, furs and animal sinew, and the many uses of birch bark. A
jargon composed of French and Mi’kmawi’simk (the native language of the
Mi’kmaq) became the lingua franca of the countryside, and many colonists learned to
communicate (at least a little) with their Native cousins. All this made Acadian culture
unique among the settler traditions that developed on the Atlantic coast of North
America.
There was a material side to this as well. Ceding the wooded uplands to the
Mi’kmaq for their migratory hunting, fishing and gathering, the colonists confined
their settlements to the coastal lowlands where the tidal variation is one of the greatest
in the world (as much as 50 feet at the site of the village of Grand Pré on Minas Basin
at the head of the Bay of Fundy). In one of the most remarkable developments in the
history of the colonization of North America, French colonists in l’Acadie developed
the distinctive practice of dyking the tidal marshlands to create pastures and fields.
This was no small task and required the energies of the entire community working
together. It sealed a pattern of good relations with the Mi’kmaq, for instead of moving
onto Native lands – as, for example, the settlers in New England did – the Acadians
created land of their own without infringing on the estate of the Mi’kmaq.
The communal work on the dykes was perhaps the most important factor in the
development of a common sense of Acadian identity. The first test of that identity
came when Port Royal, the chief settlement in l’Acadie, was captured in 1654 by a
heavily armed Puritan fleet out of Boston. The English claim to the province dated
from the early-17th century when the English Crown asserted its right to the region,
which it called “Nova Scotia” (or New Scotland). As French officials and soldiers
prepared for repatriation to France, the Yankee conquerors offered the colonists a
choice of either returning to their mother country or remaining “unmolested” on their
marshland farms, with “liberty of conscience allowed to [their] religion”. We do not
know precisely what the colonists thought about the Yankee conquest or their offer,
but we do know what they did – they chose to stay, taking an oath “that they would
no longer bear arms against the English nation” (p. 59). It marked a critical turning
point, strongly suggesting that the colonists’ attachment to their new home was more
powerful than their identification with the mother country. It is at this point, I think,
it is fair to begin thinking of the people as the Acadians.
During the next 16 years “l’Acadie or Nova Scotia” (as it was called in the official
documents) remained under the nominal control of New England and, after taking an
oath of loyalty to the English king, the Acadians were allowed to govern themselves.
When France regained possession of the colony – in exchange for territorial
concessions in the West Indies – French colonial officials found that the Acadians had
grown accustomed to living without supervision. They exhibited “a certain English
and Parliamentary inclination”, reported one French governor (p. 68). Another
complained that the Acadians were “so little accustomed to subjection it seems to me
they live as true republicans” (p. 107).
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In 1690, during a conflict known in the colonies as King William’s War, l’Acadie
passed to New England’s control once again when another Boston armada forced the
surrender of Port Royal. The Acadians agreed to take another English oath of loyalty,
but insisted on a condition: that in the struggle between the English and the French
empires “they themselves would remain neutral” (p. 96).
This is the first evidence that I can find in the historical record of the Acadian
insistence on their status as neutrals. The claim of neutrality was rare but not
unprecedented. The pope granted the residents of the Channel Islands the “privilege
of neutrality”, allowing them protection in time of war between England and France,
a privilege that Elizabeth I renewed in 1561 and which continued until the late-17th
century. There are also North American examples. After the conquest of New Sweden
by New Netherland in the 1650s, the Finnish, Swedish and Dutch settlers asked
Governor Peter Stuyvesant that they “not . . . be obliged to take sides if any troubles
should arise between the Crown of Sweden and [the United Provinces] at home”, a
request Styuvesant granted.3 When his superiors objected, he argued that only with
such a tolerant policy would officials win the hearts of the residents. In the case of
l’Acadie the idea of neutrality became part of the Acadian conception of themselves
as a people. It was a response to the facts of life on the margins of empire, to the
uncertain ricochet of their homeland back and forth between empires and sovereigns.
Learning to be a people “in between”, they developed a willingness to do business
with anyone, French, English or otherwise. Their marshland farms produced ample
surpluses of fruit, grain and livestock, and the Acadians established a particularly
lucrative commerce with Yankee traders, whom they jokingly referred to as nos amis
les ennemis – “our friends the enemy”. The phrase captured something essential about
the Acadian situation. They lived in a world on the margins, a world of ambiguities,
a world where by necessity people had to learn to play both sides, a world where, as
the Acadians put it, “cunning was better than strength” (p. 79). Many would be the
times the Acadians would successfully employ cunning to combat the strength of
imperialists.
France regained control of “l’Acadie or Nova Scotia” in 1697, then lost it again in
1710, during Queen Anne’s War (the War of the Spanish Succession) when yet
another armed Yankee fleet conquered Port Royal and took possession in the name of
the British Crown. The 1713 treaty ending the war formalized British control. The
Acadians were once more given the choice of leaving or remaining in the province,
with guarantees of the free exercise of religion and the security of their property as
long as they agreed to become subjects of the British Crown. This required swearing
an oath of loyalty.
Oaths of allegiance on the transfer of a colony from one empire to another were an
accepted practice. Such a transfer took place numerous times in the 17th-century
Delaware Valley, where the European settlers were required to swear allegiance as
many as six times. As I have said, the Acadians themselves had taken such oaths to
the English Crown before – in both 1654 and 1690. What was different this time was
3 Mark L. Thompson, “National Subjects in a Contested Colonial Space: Allegiance, Ethnicity, and
Authority in the Seventeenth-Century Delaware Valley”, PhD diss., John Hopkins University, 2004,
p. 269.
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the insistence that the oath be unconditional. The Acadians declared themselves
willing to take an oath, but only with the inclusion of a condition: “That we will take
up arms neither against his Britannic Majesty, nor against France, nor against any of
their subjects or allies, by which they meant their cousins, the Míkmaq, allies of the
French” (p. 147).
The British found themselves in a difficult position. The colony ranked low in their
colonial priorities. They wished to maintain a garrison and small colonial
establishment at Annapolis Royal (the new name for Port Royal) to check French
ambitions in the region, but doing so required the material support of the Acadians,
who supplied essential food, fuel and manpower for the operation. The British
debated the idea of undertaking the removal of the Acadians and the resettlement of
the province with British settlers, but in the end they rejected the scheme as too
expensive. The British were stuck and the Acadians knew it.
The controversy over an unconditional oath continued for more than 15 years,
ending only when the British colonial governor finally agreed to the Acadian terms.
In 1730 Acadian leaders agreed to sign an oath of allegiance and in return the
governor made an oral concession (which the Acadians recorded and had notarized)
declaring “that he exempts them from bearing arms and fighting in war against the
French and the Indians, and that the said inhabitants have only accepted allegiance on
the promise never to take up arms”. The British later denied having made the
concession, but we have good reason to doubt their veracity. One British official
present at the negotiations later testified that when the governor demanded the
Acadians swear an unconditional oath “they at first absolutely refused”. The officer
then noted that, following earnest discussion, “they at last swore allegiance, after
having extorted the same assurance . . . , that they should not be obliged to bear arms”
(p. 177-8).
In the years following this agreement the Acadians became widely known as “the
neutral French”. Neutrality was shorthand for their complex relationship to the
colonial world. It stood for their intimate and cooperative connection to the Mi’kmaq,
with whom they shared the land. It stood for their cultural identity, one that retained
its French origins in custom, language and religion, yet was at the same time
something new, something American in its attachment to place, local practice and
newly developed traditions. It stood for their problematic relationship to empire, their
desire to participate wholeheartedly in the opportunities for wider commercial
connections, but also for their insistence on an exemption from the violent and
destructive inter-colonial struggle for conquest and hegemony. It also stood for their
variety of “republicanism”, for the idea that they had rights as a people as well as the
right to argue for themselves and their interests in the court of kings.
If we date the origins of Acadian neutrality to the first period of English control
beginning in 1654, we can say that this policy of neutrality served the inhabitants very
well for nearly a century. But the situation began to change for the worse in 1744
when, after 30 years of peace, the British and French went to war once again in a
conflict known in the colonies as King George’s War (the War of the Austrian
Succession). French forces invaded l’Acadie and besieged the British garrison at
Annapolis Royal. Although a number of Acadians fought alongside the French
invaders, others provided critical intelligence to the British and the great majority did
their best to remain neutral.
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The wartime climate of anti-French and anti-Catholic sentiment in New England,
however, put the Acadians at great risk. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts
was convinced that Acadian neutrality was nothing but a sham and that the Acadians
were treasonous supporters of the French. Shirley would become one of the primary
architects of “the great and noble scheme”. In 1745 he urged “the immediate removal
of some at least of the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia” and the settlement of New
England families “in their room” (p. 231). The Governor’s Council of Nova Scotia,
composed principally of Yankee emigrés, took Shirley’s recommendation a step
further. “Upon the whole”, they wrote to British officials in London, “it is most
humbly submitted whether the said French Inhabitants may not be transported out of
the Province of Nova Scotia and be replac’d by good Protestant Subjects” (p. 229).
When the news leaked out, there was panic in the Acadian community and to prevent
them from going over the French en mass, Governor Shirley was forced to issue a
public proclamation denying that any such deportation was being contemplated. In
private letters to imperial officials, however, Shirley continued to argue for the
removal of at least some of the Acadians and their replacement by Yankee farmers.
The war ended by treaty in 1748 and British officials decided not to pursue
Shirley’s plan of removal. They had decided to “postpone anything of this kind for the
present”, the colonial minister wrote to Shirley, but he added a significant postscript
– “tho’ His Majesty would have you consider, in what manner such a Scheme may be
executed, at a proper Time, and What Precautions may be necessary to be taken, to
obviate the Inconveniences that are apprehended from it” (p. 241). This
quintessentially bureaucratic language had chilling implications.
In the mid-18th century the colonial world of North America was on the verge of
an enormous transformation. Before 1748 the pretext for hostilities between Great
Britain and France was centered in Europe while afterwards the violent conflict
between the two empires fixed on control of the seas, on the struggle for colonial
possessions and on the privilege of unimpeded expansion in North America. Both the
French and the British believed that l’Acadie or Nova Scotia, at the raw northeastern
edge of their respective empires, would be one of the flashpoints of the coming
conflict. To counter the great French fortress of Louisbourg, north of Nova Scotia on
Cape Breton Island, the British committed themselves to establishing a fortress and
naval base of their own in Nova Scotia.
In 1749 several thousand Protestant colonists from the British Isles and the
continent arrived on the Atlantic coast of the province and began the construction of
the fortified port town of Halifax. A new military government was installed under the
leadership of Governor Edward Cornwallis, uncle of Charles Cornwallis, famous in
American history as the general who surrendered the British army to Washington at
Yorktown in 1781. One of Governor Cornwallis’s primary instructions was to finally
resolve the Acadian problem.
Cornwallis, a member of the English aristocracy, was a career military officer who
had served on the personal staff of the Duke of Cumberland, second-born son of King
George II. He had been at Cumberland’s side in 1745 when the duke turned back the
French-backed invasion of Charles Stuart, Catholic pretender to the British throne.
Cornwallis led his regiment at the Battle of Culloden, brutally crushing Stuart’s
Scottish supporters. In the aftermath of the battle he commanded raiding parties sent
into the remotest parts of the Scottish Highlands to “pacify” the population, raids
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legendary for their brutality and bloodlust. He supervised the burning of Catholic
chapels and the torture of Catholic priests. He was instrumental in the “Scottish
clearances”, executing orders to expel the most troublesome of the Highland Scots
from their homeland. This was the man the British selected to handle the Acadian
problem. His staff was composed largely of others who shared his experience,
including the man that became Cornwallis’s protégé, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles
Lawrence, who soon was appointed lieutenant-governor.
Cornwallis had no specific instructions to expel the Acadians. Rather, he was
expected to intimidate them into submission. A new civil government would be
established to rule the province, but the Acadians, as Catholics, would be permitted
neither to vote nor to hold office. They would be required, however, to swear an
unconditional oath of allegiance. Those who did so would be allowed to “continue in
the free exercise of their Religion . . . [and] the Peaceable Possession of such Lands
as are under their cultivation” (p. 250). Those who refused would be forced to vacate
the province, forfeiting all their property. Cornwallis had no actual plan to effect the
removal of the Acadians, since he fully expected that they would bend to his pressure.
They did not. Governor Cornwallis anticipated humble and cloying peasants,
tugging at their caps. He was surprised to find subtle and assertive republicans. To his
demand that the Acadians swear an unconditional oath, the inhabitants reiterated their
long-held position. While they were willing to take another oath, they insisted on an
explicit exemption from bearing arms. They argued that since this exemption had
been endorsed by the king’s representative in 1730, and it had been accepted as the
ruling assumption of their civil life for nearly 20 years, the exemption had the force
of law. “Acts proposed by the people”, they asserted, “when they are approved by
Royal authority, acquire a force which the king himself cannot take away from them”.
Consider the meaning of this remarkable statement; their neutrality was part of the
customary law of l’Acadie or Nova Scotia and thus their identity was protected by the
common law of Englishmen. It was a brilliant and original formulation. “It appears to
me that you think yourselves independent”, Cornwallis responded, “and you wish to
treat with the King as if you were so” (pp. 253-5).
This is a “tragic” story not simply because it is sad but because, as in classical
tragedy, the Acadians helped to shape their own fate. They stood up for principles.
Residents of the British colonies of North America were years away from declaring
their rights as republicans yet here were the Acadians standing before British
governors and making the case for similar rights. I think of them as premature
republicans – a little too early for their own good. The Acadian story is a remarkable
one, because the rights for which they were arguing were not that different from the
rights ordinary British colonists would assert in the 1760s and 1770s.
Many Acadians responded to the new British threats by abandoning their homes
and farms and decamping for French-controlled territory. The new military
government was “reducing us to the condition of the Irish”, one group declared. “Thus
we see ourselves on the brink of destruction, liable to be captured and transported . . .
and to lose our religion” (p. 264). The Mi’kmaq responded to the new British military
assertiveness by declaring war and launching a series of destructive attacks against
Protestant settlers in the Halifax area. Over the next four years the province was
overtaken by spasmodic violence. Cornwallis eventually resigned in failure and
returned to England and, by late 1753, the military government was in the hands of
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Lieutenant-Governor Charles Lawrence. “I cannot help being of the opinion”, he
wrote to London in one of his first official dispatches, “that it would be much better,
if [the Acadians] refuse the oaths, that they were away” (p. 282). He asked for official
approval.
Much attention has been focused on the responsibility of the authorities in London
for le grand dérangement. Lawrence did not receive a reply to his request for
authorization for the expulsion until January 1755. The colonial office refused to
either approve or disapprove, but instructed him to act on his own. I think the
conclusion is obvious: by shifting responsibility to local authorities, officials in
London were distancing themselves from what was about to take place, providing
themselves with “plausible deniability”. Better to let Lawrence take the risk –
something it turned out he was more than willing to do. Only after the dirty job had
been done – after thousands of Acadians had been removed from their communities
and shipped off in transport vessels, after thousands more had fled into the woods
where they suffered from exposure, starvation, and disease, and after Acadian
property had been looted and Acadian communities torched – only then did British
officials offer an endorsement. The operation, the colonial minister wrote to the king
in the aftermath, had been “crowned with a success greatly beyond our expectations
and almost equal to our wishes”. The expulsion of the Acadians had made available,
he wrote, “vast quantities of the most fertile land in an actual state of cultivation, and
in those parts of the Province the most advantageously situated for commerce” (p.
410). His comments make it clear that ultimate responsibility lay with the British
state.
But I would extend that responsibility. Longfellow’s Evangeline impressed readers
with its tale of Acadian sufferings and exile. But perhaps because Longfellow was a
New Englander himself, the poem offered no hint of the important role that Yankees
played in the removal. Yet the fact is that New Englanders were the most prominent
players in the planning of the “great and noble scheme” of Acadian removal.
Even as Lawrence sought the sanction of London authorities, he already had in
hand a comprehensive plan for the removal of the Acadians. It had been prepared by
provincial surveyor Charles Morris, a Massachusetts native and a protégé of Governor
William Shirley. Morris’s thinking echoed that of his mentor. The Acadians
controlled all of the best land in the province, he argued, and a program of Protestant
colonization would require the confiscation of their farms and the expulsion of the
Acadians themselves. “Without their removal”, he wrote in one of the several official
reports he authored on the Acadian problem, “I am sure it would be impossible any
large number of Protestants can ever be settled in the Country”. Morris urged a
military campaign to eliminate once and for all the Acadian presence: “They are at all
adventures to be rooted out, and the most effectual way is to destroy all these
settlements by burning down all their houses, cutting the dikes, and destroying all the
grain now growing” (pp. 288-9).
In mid-1754 Morris delivered his most comprehensive report to date. The long
title told the tale: “Some Reflections on the Situation of the Inhabitants, commonly
called Neutrals, and some methods proposed to prevent their escape out of the Colony,
in case upon being acquainted with the design of removing them, they should attempt
to desert over to the French neighboring settlements . . .” (p. 289). Morris made no
attempt to argue the case for removal in this report – he had done that many times
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previously – but focused instead on detailing the operations necessary to put it into
effect. These plans had to be kept secret, he wrote, for once the Acadians knew about
them it would be impossible to prevent them from fleeing the province and
contributing their capacious skills as sailors and rangers to the French enemy. The
British must strike them by stealth. Morris considered a variety of stratagems by
which this might be accomplished. Perhaps the inhabitants could be captured while
they were at mass on Sunday or surprised in the dead of night while they were in their
beds. But their scattered hamlets would make these difficult operations to man and
coordinate.
The best alternative, he concluded, was to set a trap the Acadians would fall into
voluntarily and on their own accord. The men could be summoned to attend a
meeting, then seized and held hostage against the surrender of their families. It would
be critical, he suggested, to encourage them to think they were being sent to join their
French brethren: “It will much facilitate their readiness to go if a persuasion could
obtain among them that they are to be removed to Canada”. In that case, others would
come in voluntarily to join their captive kindred. Nonetheless, some inhabitants
certainly would make an attempt to escape, so Morris drew up detailed plans for
blocking “the passages by which they may desert the Colony” (p. 290). In its cold
calculation, its weighing of various stratagems and its invention of tricks and lies,
Morris’s logic was diabolical. Once they were in British hands, he argued, it would be
necessary to disperse the Acadians in small groups throughout the empire, as far from
their homeland as possible. Morris aimed at nothing less than the complete destruction
of the Acadian community.
It is worth repeating that this plan was written considerably more than a year before
Lawrence set it into operation in the autumn of 1755. The operational plan of removal
was the logical culmination of political assumptions and implications that had been
developing since the mid-1740s. Let me be explicit about why I think this is so
important. The comparative history of ethnic cleansing – a field that has developed in
the last ten years or so – makes it perfectly clear that most such operations are not
carried out spontaneously by enraged and inflamed populations. They are typically the
result of carefully conceived plans, often years in the making. They are conceived and
methodically executed by states. And that was precisely the case with Morris’s
operational plan, which Charles Lawrence put into effect point by point.
Moreover, the operation was carefully planned in conjunction with Governor
William Shirley of Massachusetts. It was authorized by the Nova Scotia Governor’s
Council, largely made up of Yankees. It was then executed by Yankee troops led (for
the most part) by Yankee officers and provisioned by Yankee merchants. The
Acadians were transported in Yankee vessels, with Yankee crews and Yankee
captains. And the country once possessed by Acadian farmers was eventually resettled
by Yankee families from Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire. New Englanders were thus the principal schemers and beneficiaries of
Acadian removal, making this as much an American as a Canadian story.
I’ll close by returning to the Acadians of Sainte-Anne (which eventually became
Fredericton, the capital of New Brunswick). After the fall of Quebec, the refugees
from Sainte-Anne, who had fled there, returned to Rivière Saint-Jean with official
permission to resettle their lands. An outraged Governor Lawrence deported many of
them, but a small number avoided his roundup, rebuilt their homes at Sainte-Anne (by
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then renamed “Sainte-Anne’s Point” by Planter settlers) and, in 1767, after taking an
unconditional oath of allegiance to the British Crown, had their presence formally
authorized. But their upheaval was not yet over. After the American Revolution, they
were forced to yield their cultivated lands to Loyalist refugees from New England,
including many of the officers and troops who had carried out le grande dérangement.
The Acadians of Sainte-Anne eventually found homes in the Madawaska Valley.
Lieutenant Moses Hazen, the Yankee who led the ranger raid on Ste. Anne, was
promoted to the rank of captain by General Jeffery Amherst. Some time later,
however, when Amherst learned that the rangers had killed and scalped Acadian
women and children, he privately condemned Hazen yet failed to bring charges  and
allowed Hazen to keep his new rank. Hazen subsequently settled in Quebec after the
Conquest and then joined American patriots during the Revolution, eventually rising
to the rank of brigadier general and, after the war, retired in upstate New York.
All of this may further remind us of the interconnectedness of American history.
Le grand dérangement is an Acadian, French, British, Canadian and American story.
As Acadian historian Édouard Richard put it more than a century ago, in order to re-
imagine that story “one must become, so to speak, by turns, a missionary, an Acadian
peasant, an Englishman and a Frenchman, a Catholic and a Protestant. One must
divest oneself of preconceived notions, narrow or broaden one’s views, penetrate into
the prejudices of all. This is not always easy, nor equally easy for every one” (p. 479).
Remembering this story requires that we recognize the wider realms of our history and
acknowledge the darker side of our past: the evil means men used to pursue the end
of continental expansion. The Acadian story indeed tells a story of North America –
a story of frontiers and borderlands at the founding moment of American history, of
a people born on the margins of empire who sought a peaceful way to live with two
masters, of those who attempted to foster peace, and of those who, out of hatred and
fear, jealousy and greed, pursued the ways of war.
JOHN MACK FARAGHER
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